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Abstract—The public blockchain was originally conceived to
process monetary transactions in a peer-to-peer network while
preventing double-spending. It has since been extended to numer-
ous other applications including execution of programs that exist
on the blockchain called “smart contracts.” Smart contracts have
a major limitation, namely they only operate on data that is on
the blockchain. Trusted entities called oracles attest to external
data in order to bring it onto the blockchain but they do so
without the robust security guarantees that blockchains generally
provide. This has the potential to turn oracles into centralized
points-of-failure. To address this concern, this paper introduces
ASTRAEA, a decentralized oracle based on a voting game that
decides the truth or falsity of propositions. Players fall into two
roles: voters and certifiers. Voters play a low-risk/low-reward role
that is resistant to adversarial manipulation while certifiers play
a high-risk/high-reward role so they are required to play with
a high degree of accuracy. This paper also presents a formal
analysis of the parameters behind the system to measure the
probability of an adversary with bounded funds being able to
successfully manipulate the oracle’s decision, that shows that the
same parameters can be set to make manipulation arbitrarily
difficult—a desirable feature for the system. Further, this analysis
demonstrates that under those conditions a Nash equilibrium
exists where all rational players are forced to behave honestly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology was originally developed to handle
monetary transactions in the form of a digital currency using
a peer-to-peer network while solving the double spending
problem [1]. In its original application, it allowed a set of
anonymous and mutually-distrusting entities to reach consen-
sus on the order of a set of such transactions. In recent years
this concept has been extended to other domains in a way that
enables such parties to reach consensus on items such as the
order of private monetary transactions [2, 3], the responsibility
for file storage in a peer-to-peer network [4], the sequence of
executed states in generalized computations [5], and more.
A major limitation of blockchain technology is its inability
to interact with the “outside world” [6, 7]. For example, in
Ethereum [5] the network can reach consensus on the outcome
of a sequence of computations. However, these computations
can only operate on data that is on the blockchain, that is, a
prior computation initiated by a user of Ethereum wrote the
relevant data into the virtual machine’s memory. The network
does not natively support reaching consensus on the validity
of such data, only the fact that it exists on the blockchain
can be agreed upon. As such, trusted entities called oracles
are needed to attest to facts in an effort to bring external
data into the consensus mechanism of a blockchain. Generally
speaking, such oracles do not provide the robust security
properties of native blockchain protocols. This may not be
a substantial limitation when the external data can be proven
correct either cryptographically (such as data that comes from
another blockchain [8, 9]), or computationally (such as the
outcomes of complex computations that are infeasible to
perform on platforms such as Ethereum [10]). However, facts
that cannot be provably verified like the ones above present
unique challenges for existing oracles.
TLSnotary [11] and TownCrier [12] are oracles that provide
cryptographically-checkable information as they attest to the
content of websites accessed using the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol. The underlying idea be-
hind these oracles is that attestations are checkable due to
the use of transport layer security (TLS). However, TLS does
not guarantee that every visitor to the site sees the same
information. Additionally, a website could maliciously alter its
output to influence on-chain attestations, creating a centralized
point-of-failure in the system. TownCrier uses Intel Software
Guard Extensions in order to protect the attestations against
a malicious operating system. In the case of Augur [13], it
uses an oracle to determine the outcome of events so as to
pay out participants in a prediction market. The oracle may
require specific users to report outcomes at specific times or
face a monetary penalty. As such, users who maliciously report
incorrect results may be subject to a dispute process. While
offering greater decentralization, Augur’s oracle does not offer
users the opportunity to drop in and out of the system at will
which is somewhat harmful to the usability of the ecosystem.
In this work, we propose ASTRAEA—a general-purpose
decentralized oracle that runs on a public ledger and leverages
human intelligence through a voting-based game. Without
loss of generality, we describe our contributions using the
Ethereum blockchain but other platforms with similar smart
contract characteristics can be utilized as the underlying
decentralized network. Entities in ASTRAEA can fall into
one or more of three roles: submitters, voters, and certifiers.
Submitters submit Boolean propositions to the system and pay
fees for doing so. Voters play a low-risk/low-reward game
where they are given the opportunity to vote on the truth
of a random proposition by placing a “small” stake in their
confidence of their vote being correct. Certifiers play a high-
risk/high-reward game where they place a “large” stake on the
outcome of the voting and certification process. For usability,
voters and certifiers are not required to be online during
particular time periods; all roles may enter or exit the system at
any time. Due to its requirement for monetary staking and fees,
the system is inherently not vulnerable to Sybil attacks [14].
In more detail, in ASTRAEA voters place a small amount of
stake and are given the opportunity to vote on a proposition
selected randomly from the system. This stake is deposited
before seeing the proposition. The outcome of voting is
the stake-weighted sum of votes. Due to the randomness
involved when selecting a proposition, voting is resistant to
manipulation by actors seeking to force an incorrect result for a
particular proposition. On the other hand, certifiers place large
stakes on the truth or falsity of propositions of their choosing.
Similar to voting, the outcome of certification is the stake-
weighted sum of certifications. However, not all propositions
necessarily carry certifications. Nevertheless, when one exists
and the voter outcome matches that of the certifier, players
who took the corresponding position are rewarded and players
who took the opposing position are penalized. When the voter
and certifier outcomes disagree, all of the certifiers who took
a position are penalized. It is important to note that votes
and certifications are sealed and revealed only at the end of
the aforementioned process. Intuitively, the proposed system
encourages certifiers to place bets on propositions for which
there is a high degree of confidence that they are true or
false, and it also encourages voters to vote accurately on the
propositions they are randomly given.
Analysis reveals that the proposed system has desirable
properties. In this paper, we determine the probability of an
adversary manipulating the voting outcome and we demon-
strate that system parameters can be chosen in a way so that
an adversary with a bounded amount of funds also has an
arbitrarily small probability of successfully manipulating it.
Further, we demonstrate that under the same conditions that
prevent an adversary from manipulating voting, the system has
a Nash equilibrium in which all players play honestly. Finally,
we argue that the certification process avoids degenerate coor-
dination strategies in which users always vote with a constant
“true” or “false” without regard to the validity of the actual
proposition so as to earn a profit.
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. Sec-
tion II gives a brief overview of blockchains, oracles, and key
assumptions. Section III follows with a summary of current
blockchain oracle projects. Sections IV and V introduce AS-
TRAEA and analyze it from a game-theoretical direction. An
extension to ASTRAEA is presented in Section VI. Finally,
applications of a decentralized oracle are shown in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND SYSTEM ASSUMPTIONS
A. The Distributed Public Ledger
Bitcoin [1] is a blockchain-based distributed ledger of
monetary transactions which transfers coins between users
identified by their public keys and certified by digital signa-
tures. Transactions are grouped into blocks which are ordered
lists of transactions. Each block contains a hash that commits
to the previous block, forming a hash-linked chain (i.e., a
blockchain). An unambiguous head of the chain determines
the precise order in which transactions occurred, preventing
double-spending. Bitcoin’s [1] primary innovation was the use
of Proof-of-Work (PoW) to reach consensus on the head of the
chain. Miners combine transactions into blocks. Each block
has a header consisting of a hash of its own transactions, a
hash of the previous block header, and a nonce used for PoW.
Users select as the head the block with the most cumulative
work in its history. Rewriting the chain to undo a transaction
requires repeating PoW, and the further back in history the
transaction is, the more work is required.
Ethereum [5] uses similar ideas to generalize consensus
on the state of a virtual Turing-complete computer. Ethereum
transactions may additionally insert a smart contract [15] into
the virtual machine or call a function of an existing contract
thus extending the applicability and usability of a blockchain.
B. Oracles
This work focuses on a particular issue facing smart con-
tracts: their inability to act on data that exists outside the
blockchain. Smart contract execution must be deterministic
in order to be publicly verifiable in perpetuity. As such,
they cannot directly pull data from e.g., the Internet. For
example, consider a contract to allow wagers on the outcome
of the Mayweather vs McGregor boxing match [16]. It would
be straightforward to devise a smart contract that pays out
bettors based on a flag representing the outcome of the match,
but trustlessly determining the value of that flag is a major
challenge. In that sense, oracles allow a blockchain to interact
with the real, outside world.
C. System Assumptions
This paper presents ASTRAEA, an oracle that decides the
truth value of Boolean propositions. We assume each propo-
sition p has a truth value t that is either true (T ) or false
(F ). There are N players (voters and certifiers) numbered 1
through N . For each proposition p and each i ∈ [1, N ], let
βi(p) ∈ {T, F} denote the belief of player i regarding the
truth value of proposition p. Each player i has an accuracy
qi ∈ [0, 1] that is, informally, the probability that player i is
correct about a given proposition. Formally:
βi(p) =
{
t with probability qi
¬t with probability (1 − qi)
(1)
The value of βi(p) is independent of βj(p) for all j 6= i.
That is, each player’s beliefs are independent of all other
players’ beliefs. Entities that have non-independent beliefs
(e.g., users that pool their voting efforts in the style of mining
pools [17]) are treated as a single player. Further βi(p) is
independent of βi(p
′) for all p′ 6= p. That is, a player’s belief
in a proposition is independent of her beliefs in all other
propositions. An honest player always votes or certifies that
proposition p has truth value βi(p).
III. PRIOR ART
The challenge of smart contracts interacting with the outside
world has spawned numerous oracle proposals with varying
degrees of centralization, performance, and scope tradeoffs. A
brief description of previous work is found here.
A. Existing Blockchain Oracle Proposals
Hivemind (previously Truthcoin) [18] is a prediction mar-
ketplace built upon Bitcoin. It allows users to report on the
predicted outcome of a future event by staking reputation
currency, while traders trade on the event’s market using base
currency (i.e., Bitcoin). However, it requires a complex scheme
to balance incentives involving two currencies and it has a
permissioned and centralized implementation due to token
distribution limitations. Augur [13] is a prediction market
platform built upon Ethereum, heavily inspired by Truthcoin.
Gnosis [19] and its fork Delphi [20] are also prediction
markets built upon Ethereum. Both suffer from a gameable
dispute resolution design and centralized token distribution.
ChainLink [21] aims to provide a cross-chain portal to
internet-available information i.e., data available on websites,
through their centralized system. Oraclize.it [22] is a central-
ized platform that creates trusted blockchain transactions for
use in smart contracts [16].
Town Crier [12] uses a stack of trusted hardware and
software, and publishes proofs that this computational stack
has not been tampered with. This system is highly effective,
so long as users trust that the underlying hardware does not
contain backdoors or exploits [23, 24]. In effect, the validity
and accuracy of the protocol depends on a central authority.
All in all, the need of oracles to assist smart contracts was
identified shortly after blockchain technology came into exis-
tence but no truly decentralized, trustless, and permissionless
solution has been presented until this work.
IV. ASTRAEA
This section presents the decentralized voting-based oracle
ASTRAEA. It begins with a high-level overview of the user
roles and the operation of the voting game and concludes
with a detailed description of the game. The next section
analyzes the coordination game, illustrates its properties, and
demonstrates a desirable Nash equilibrium.
A. Overview
Users of ASTRAEA participate in one (or more) of the
following three roles: submitters, voters, and certifiers, that
behave as follows.
• Submitters choose which propositions enter into the sys-
tem by allocating money to fund (in part) the subsequent
effort to validate the Boolean propositions.
• Voters play a low-risk/low-reward role. Once such a
player submits a deposit (stake), she is given the chance
to vote on a proposition chosen uniformly at random from
the ones available. The stake is placed before the voter
is notified of which proposition she will be voting on.
The steps of this process are depicted in Figure 1. The
outcome of the voting process is a function of the sum of
the votes weighted by the deposits. The maximum voting
deposit is a parameter of the system.
• Certifiers play a high-risk/high-reward role. They choose
an available proposition and place a large deposit in order
to certify it as either true or false. The certification out-
come is a function of the sum of certifications weighted
by the deposits. This process is depicted in Figure 2.
1. Stake
2. Random proposition
3. Sealed vote
ASTRAEA
Fig. 1. Player voting in ASTRAEA
1. Stake
2. Chosen proposition
3. Sealed certification
ASTRAEA
Fig. 2. Player certifying in ASTRAEA
Since certifiers choose which propositions to certify, not
all propositions are guaranteed to have certification, and
indeed the system does not mandate them to do so. The
minimum certification deposit size is a system parameter
and should be large enough that certifying incurs a
substantial risk.
Setting the parameters appropriately is important for the
functionality of the system. The maximum voting deposit
size should be small relative to the total voting stake on
each proposition. If a single vote can account for 100% of
a proposition’s total voting stake, an adversary can have total
control over the outcome of a randomly drawn proposition.
Conversely, if it is 1%, the adversary would somehow need
to draw the same proposition repeatedly to control its validity
outcome. On the other hand, the minimum certification deposit
should be large enough that certifiers incur sufficient risk.
Otherwise, they may be tempted to abuse their certifications
for griefing purposes as a malicious certification can impact
reward payouts for other players. At first sight, it seems like
individual certifiers have enormous influence on the process
for individual propositions, and indeed this can be the case.
However, as described later in the paper, the certifiers alone
cannot force the oracle to produce an incorrect value and they
are encouraged to behave honestly by the incentive structure;
otherwise they face large penalties.
B. The Proposition List
A key aspect of the system is the set of propositions
over which voters and certifiers play the game. We assume
that there exists a set of propositions constructed outside of
ASTRAEA called the proposition list, which is denoted by P
and is of fixed size |P |. Each proposition pi ∈ P has a hidden
truth value ti and is associated with a bounty amount Bi, the
source of which is described later. The voting game described
later is played over all propositions in P simultaneously.
In addition, we assume there are two certifier reward pools
containing RT and RF monetary units, intended to reward
certifiers for true and false outcomes, respectively. The
use of two separate reward pools is intended to avoid a
degenerate coordination strategy in which users always vote
and certify with a constant true or false so as to maximize
their profit without expending any effort and its rationale is
justified later in this paper.
The proposition list can be constructed in a variety of ways
and it is outside the scope of this paper. For instance, an
auction could be conducted for the |P | spaces, with the auction
prices becoming the bounty for each proposition.
Voters
Certifiers
si;r;v
r
v
σi;j;c
B3
BjP j
B2
B1
$ $
RT RFj; c
: : :
p3
pjP j
P
p1
p2
Fig. 3. Overview of ASTRAEA
After reaching a termination condition, propositions are
decided, at which point the game outcome is computed, the
proposition is removed from the list, and the corresponding re-
wards and penalties are administered. A proposition is decided
after it has received a certain amount of voting stake denoted
Dv, which is the same for all propositions. The proposition can
then be replaced with a new one by, for instance, conducting
another auction.
C. System Description
For each of the N players, si,j,b denotes the amount that
player i has staked on voting that proposition pj is b where
b ∈ {T, F}. If player i has not voted on proposition j, then
si,j,T and si,j,F are both equal to 0. Otherwise, one or both (in
the case where player i has voted more than once in differing
directions) are nonzero and equal to the stake with which they
voted. Additionally, let σi,j,b denote the amount of stake that
player i used to certify that proposition pj is b ∈ {T, F}.
Let smax and σmin denote the maximum voting stake and
minimum certifying stake parameters, respectively.
An overview of the game architecture is shown in Figure 3.
It depicts a set of players who are either voters, certifiers, or
both. In that figure, the differing mechanisms of interaction
with the propositions can also be seen. Voters must engage in
a multi-step process in order to vote on random propositions,
while certifiers simply submit a certification to a proposition
of their choosing in one step.
1) Voting: Players may place a deposit in order to vote
on a randomly-chosen proposition. First, the voter indicates
a desire to stake an amount of money si,r,v ≤ smax on a
vote for proposition pr, where r is not yet known to the voter.
Subsequently, the system chooses the value for r and sends
it to the voter. Note that r is chosen uniformly at random
from [1, |P |], so a voter may be given the opportunity to vote
on the same proposition more than once. Generating random
numbers in smart contracts is a topic of active research and
several techniques exist to do so securely [25, 26], including
ones that use an oracle [22]. Finally, the voter submits a sealed
vote v ∈ {T, F}. This can be accomplished using a commit-
reveal scheme in which the voter commits to a hash of their
vote concatenated with a nonce and later reveals the vote and
nonce. We define an honest voter as one who always votes
according to their belief βi(pr).
2) Certifying: Players may place a large deposit in order
to certify propositions of their choosing. The certifier simply
TABLE I
VOTING OUTCOMES
Outcome Condition
T sTOT,j,T > sTOT,j,F
F sTOT,j,F > sTOT,j,T
Ø sTOT,j,T = sTOT,j,F
TABLE II
CERTIFYING OUTCOMES
Outcome Condition
T σTOT,j,T > σTOT,j,F
F σTOT,j,F > σTOT,j,T
Ø σTOT,j,T = σTOT,j,F
submits a monetary stake σi,j,c ≥ σmax and a sealed certifi-
cation c ∈ {T, F} for proposition pj . An honest certifier is
one who always certifies according to their belief βi(pj).
3) Termination and Decision: Once a proposition pj has
accumulated sufficient voting stake, it is decided. The amount
of voting stake before decision is a parameter of the system de-
noted by Dv. Four values are computed: sTOT,j,T , sTOT,j,F ,
σTOT,j,T , and σTOT,j,F . These values represent, respectively,
the total voting stake for true, total voting stake for false,
total certifying stake for true, and total certifying stake for
false. For each b ∈ {T, F}, they are computed as follows:
sTOT,j,b =
N∑
i=1
si,j,b σTOT,j,b =
N∑
i=1
σi,j,b
Voting and certifying outcomes are computed as shown
in Tables I and II. It can be seen that a simple majority
determines the outcome. In case of a tie, the voting outcome
is unknown (denoted by Ø). The same formula applies for
certification outcomes. Alternatively, the system can require a
super-majority instead of a simple majority for a definite T and
F outcome and produce a Ø outcome otherwise. Ultimately
this does not affect the design or the analysis of the game and
it is excluded from the description for the sake of simplicity.
The game and oracle outcomes that correspond to each
of the nine possible combinations of certification and voting
results are illustrated in Table III. The headings in the top row
correspond to certification, while the labels in the first column
correspond to voting.
The game has three possible outcomes: true (T ), false
(F ), and unknown (Ø), each of which carries its own
reward structure. Note that the game outcome is only used
to determine rewards and penalties, and does not necessarily
correspond exactly to the oracle’s output. Indeed, anyone
observing the system is free to compute oracle outcomes as
they wish and depending on the context of the proposition.
For the sake of this presentation a suggested mapping is
TABLE III
OUTCOMES FOR (A) THE GAME AND (B) THE ORACLE
(a) GAME
V
C
T F Ø
T T Ø Ø
F Ø F Ø
Ø Ø Ø Ø
(b) ORACLE
V
C
T F Ø
T T Ø T
F Ø F F
Ø Ø Ø Ø
presented in Table III-b. The suggested oracle output follows
the voting outcome if it matches the certification outcome or
the certification outcome is Ø. The oracle is not restricted to
an output of {T, F,Ø}, but could instead have an output in
the range [0, 1] indicating confidence in the truth or falsity of
the proposition.
D. Rewards and Penalties
Broadly speaking, players are only rewarded for T and
F outcomes in which they took a position that matches it.
Conversely, those who took opposing positions are penalized.
In unknown outcomes, certifiers are penalized and voters
receive no rewards or penalties. As argued in the paper, this
scheme incentivizes the participants to behave honestly on the
validity of propositions.
For the rest of this subsection, fix a player i ∈ [1, N ] and
proposition pj ∈ P to be decided so as to enumerate the
rewards and penalties for each of the three possible game
outcomes. Voter and certifier rewards are presented separately
although, as noted earlier, nothing prohibits a player from
being both a voter and a certifier.
Rewards and penalties are distilled into a single value rv
for voting and rc for certification. A negative value indicates
a penalty, while a positive one indicates a reward. The results
are summarized in Table IV.
1) True and False Outcomes: In the case of a T outcome,
the voting reward is as follows.
rv =
(
si,j,T
sTOT,j,T
)
×Bj − si,j,F (2)
The player’s vote reward is their share of the T -voting stake
times the proposition’s bounty amount. Their penalty is equal
to their F -voting stake. The certifier reward is shown in Eq. 3
below.
rc =
(
σi,j,T
σTOT,j,T
)
×
(
RT ×
1
τ
)
− σi,j,F (3)
A certifier’s reward is equal to her share of the T -certifying
stake times the true certifier reward pool amount RT times
the reciprocal of the certification target τ . The true reward
pool is a reward pool used to reward certifiers who correctly
certify articles as true. The certification target can be seen as
the number of certifications that the pool should have enough
funds to pay for. For instance, if RT = 1000 and τ = 10,
then 100 monetary units will be distributed to the certifiers.
The next proposition will have RT = 900, and therefore 90
units will be distributed.
In the case of an F outcome, the rewards and penalties are
similar.
2) Unknown Outcome: For an outcome of Ø (unknown),
voters are neither rewarded nor penalized (rv = 0), while
certifiers are penalized as follows.
rc = − (σi,j,F + σi,j,T ) (4)
That is, certifiers forfeit all of their stake, regardless of
agreement with voters. The rationale for penalizing certifiers
and not voters is that certifiers chose to certify proposition pj
while voters did not choose to vote on it as they received it
at random.
E. Monetary Flows
Note that voters are not rewarded for unknown outcomes,
and therefore bounties are not claimed. Thus far, the distri-
bution of penalties and unclaimed bounties has not been dis-
cussed, and the funding of reward pools and bounty amounts
has only been briefly mentioned.
Submitter fees are used to fund bounties, while the certifier
reward pools are initially left empty. Certifier reward pools are
funded by unclaimed bounties and penalties. In the absence
of reward pools, certification will be rare, which will lead to
most bounties being unclaimed. It is expected that this method
will approach equilibrium where reward pools and bounties
are balanced to provide reasonable incentives for both voters
and certifiers. Further, it is adaptable as it can approach a new
equilibrium automatically if external conditions change.
An additional consideration is the draining of reward pools.
Each time a proposition is decided with voting outcome T ,
an amount RT
τ
is subtracted from RT . If the certification
outcome is also T , the funds are used to pay out certifier
rewards. Otherwise, the funds are added to RF . A symmetric
case applies for false outcomes. The reasoning behind this
is explained in Section V-D but its intuition lies in the fact that
it ensures that the reward pools encourage certifiers to certify
equal numbers of true and false propositions, thereby
discouraging voters from voting with constant T or F values
in order to maximize profit without considering the actual
propositions.
V. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
To analyze ASTRAEA we first construct formulas relating
the parameters of the system to the probability of the voting
procedure producing incorrect results (i.e., where the outcome
for proposition pj with truth value tj is ¬tj ). Next, we
introduce mathematics that relate the system parameters to
the minimum accuracy needed by voters so that they remain
profitable. Subsequently, we prove that a Nash equilibrium
exists where all players play honestly under a form of honest
majority assumption on the voters. Finally, we argue that
the certifier reward structure avoids a situation where players
profitably vote and certify everything with a constant T or F ,
even if the proposition list is heavily biased towards true or
false propositions.
A. Voting Outcomes and Manipulation
This subsection determines the probability that voting out-
comes are correct as a function of accuracy and extends
the analysis to determine an adversary’s probability of forc-
ing incorrect outcomes. For simplicity, we assume all non-
adversarial players are honest, have the same accuracy q,
and always vote with smax monetary units of stake. We can
therefore treat the voting process on a single proposition as a
sequence of Dv
smax
Bernoulli trials with probability q of success.
The probability that the voting outcome is correct is therefore:
P
[
B
(
Dv
smax
, q
)
>
Dv
2 · smax
]
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF REWARDS AND PENALTIES
Reward Penalty
Outcome Voters Certifiers Voters Certifiers
T
(
si,j,T
sTOT,j,T
)
× Bj
(
σi,j,T
σTOT,j,T
)
×
(
RT ×
1
τ
)
si,j,F σi,j,F
F
(
si,j,F
sTOT,j,F
)
× Bj
(
σi,j,F
σTOT,j,F
)
×
(
RF ×
1
τ
)
si,j,T σi,j,T
Ø 0 0 0 σi,j,F + σi,j,T
where B(n, p) denotes a binomial random variable. For ex-
ample, if Dv = 20, smax = 1, and q = 0.8, the probability of
obtaining a correct voting outcome is roughly 99.7%.
Now let us assume an adversary has n monetary units and
seeks to force an incorrect outcome on a specific proposition.
For simplicity, we assume n is a multiple of smax and that
the proposition list does not change during the attack. Each
proposition can once again be modeled as a sequence of Dv
smax
Bernoulli trials. Each trial is successful with probability:
p+ (1− p)(1− q) = 1− q + p · q
where p is the probability that the vote belongs to the adver-
sary.
If the adversary uses all n tokens to vote, then n
smax
votes
belong to the adversary across all |P | propositions. Once all
propositions in the proposition list are decided, the probability
that an arbitrarily-chosen vote belongs to the adversary is:
n
smax
×
smax
|P | ·Dv
=
n
|P | ·Dv
So the probability that an arbitrary vote is incorrect is:
1− q +
n · q
|P | ·Dv
(5)
Note, both |P | and Dv appear in the denominator demon-
strating that increasing these parameters renders system ma-
nipulation more difficult. The probability of an adversary
changing the outcome of a proposition is shown below:
P
[
B
(
Dv
smax
, 1− q +
n · q
|P | ·Dv
)
>
Dv
2 · smax
]
It can be seen that if the quantity in Eq. 5 is less than 0.5,
there are parameter values that make it arbitrarily difficult for
the adversary to force an incorrect result. Table V shows the
adversary’s chance of success for various parameter values.
The six columns show the voting stake before decision, the
size of the proposition list, the voter accuracy, the fraction of
votes controlled by the adversary, the probability of forcing an
incorrect output for a specific proposition, and the probability
of doing so for any proposition, respectively. The rows where
no votes are controlled by an adversary show the probability
of an incorrect outcome occurring due to honest voter behavior
alone. It can be seen that if voters are 95% accurate and Dv =
TABLE V
PROBABILITY OF ADVERSARYMANIPULATING VOTING
Dv |P| q
n
|P|·Dv
P(Specific) P(Any)
20 · smax 100 0.8 0 0.0006 0.0548
20 · smax 100 0.8 0.05 0.0028 0.2438
20 · smax 100 0.8 0.25 0.1275 ≈ 1
20 · smax 100 0.95 0 < 1× 10−9 < 1× 10−7
20 · smax 100 0.95 0.05 < 1× 10−6 < 1× 10−4
20 · smax 100 0.95 0.25 0.0123 0.7100
100 · smax 100 0.8 0 < 1× 10−11 < 1× 10−9
100 · smax 100 0.8 0.05 < 1× 10−8 < 1× 10−6
100 · smax 100 0.8 0.25 0.0168 0.8156
100 · smax 100 0.95 0 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
100 · smax 100 0.95 0.05 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
100 · smax 100 0.95 0.25 < 1× 10−5 0.0002
100 · smax, manipulation is effectively impossible, even by a
powerful adversary controlling 25% of the votes.
B. Minimum Voting Accuracy
According to the analysis in the previous subsection, the
accuracy of honest voters is critical to the security of AS-
TRAEA. This subsection quantifies the minimum accuracy (i.e.,
the probability that the player’s belief βi(pj) matches the truth
value tj of proposition pj) players need to achieve profitability
in expectation by constructing formulas that relate the accuracy
threshold to the parameters of the system. Since making it
more difficult to earn a profit is expected to lower participation,
it is critical to set the parameters carefully to achieve a
reasonable tradeoff between accuracy and participation.
For simplicity, we assume the parameters are set such that
the probability of incorrect decisions is negligible. Consider
player i with accuracy qi. A vote with stake of smax on
proposition pj yields a profit in expectation when, at decision
time for pj :
[
qi · smax
max(sTOT,j,T , sTOT,j,F )
]
Bj > (1− qi) · smax (6)
In other words, the expected share of the voting rewards is
greater than the expected penalties. Note that there is no need
to account for Ø outcomes since voters receive neither rewards
nor penalties in that case. At decision time, the denominator
is clearly at least half of Dv, and at most Dv. Therefore:
1
2
·Dv ≤ max(sTOT,j,T , sTOT,j,F ) ≤ Dv (7)
It is clear from Eq. 6 that the voter is profitable for
sufficiently high values of Bj . Towards the goal of computing
an upper bound, we over-approximate the range in which a
voter is profitable using Eq. 7 as follows.(
qi · smax
Dv
)
Bj > (1− qi) · smax
Re-arranging yields the following upper bound on Bj :
Bj ≤
(1− qi) ·Dv
qi
(8)
By capping the bounty according to Eq. 8, it is possible to
enforce a minimum accuracy such that below that threshold
voting becomes unprofitable. For instance, if 80% accuracy
is desired and Dv = 1000, the bounty must be capped at
250 monetary units. If instead 50% accuracy is desired the
bounty must be capped at 1000. Of course this analysis only
lower-bounds the threshold; it neglects the voter’s costs in
terms of time to evaluate propositions, computing power, and
blockchain transaction fees.
C. Desirable Nash Equilibrium
This subsection demonstrates the existence of a desirable
Nash equilibrium in which all players are honest. Indeed, it is
clear that any situation in which all players always vote and
certify in concert is a Nash equilibrium, as any player who
votes against all the others will only stand to lose. However,
we seek to show that such an equilibrium exists under the
assumption that the quantity in Eq. 5 is less than 0.5. In effect,
this assumes that honest voters are sufficiently accurate and
in such plurality that a majority of votes are correct. From
the analysis in Section V-B, the assumption is sufficient to
show that there exists an assignment to the parameters such
that all propositions have the correct voting outcome with
overwhelming probability.
While we omit the details of the analysis due to space
requirements, it is clear that playing honestly is a Nash equilib-
rium when every voting outcome is correct and only feasible
strategies are considered. Rewards are only ever paid to players
who agree with the voting outcome. Since every proposition
pj has the voting outcome tj , if player i votes or certifies
βi(pj) (i.e., honestly), she agrees with the voting outcome
with probability qi. Naturally, an honest player could perform
better by switching to a “perfect” strategy in which they always
vote correctly rather than honestly, but such a strategy is not
feasible since players do not know the underlying truth values.
Since all beliefs are independent by assumption, a player
pi cannot develop complex strategies that leverage statistical
correlation between beliefs to vote correctly with probability
better than qi. Even an adversary with perfect accuracy who
controls 100% of the certifying stake is incentivized to play
honestly (or not play at all e.g., in the case where RT = 0 and
every proposition is true). Indeed, any other strategy results
in the adversary losing all of their stake.
D. Proposition Bias and Reward Pools
While the previous subsection demonstrates that playing
honestly is an equilibrium under the assumption that an
adversary does not control voting, this assumption may not
hold if a dishonest strategy is easier and still profitable. In
this subsection, we identify a candidate for such a strategy
and argue that the reward structure combats it.
Imagine true propositions are more common than false
ones and define as a lazy voter one who always votes T .
Let p = P (tj = T ) denote the probability that a random
proposition is true. We further assume as before that all
voting outcomes are correct, so the lazy voter agrees with the
voting outcome on every true proposition and disagrees on
every false proposition. Intuitively, this lazy strategy seems
viable, but note that it is also necessary to consider certifier
behavior since without certification no rewards are paid out.
Certifier incentives are tied to the certifier reward pools, and
their values fluctuate over time.
When a true proposition is decided, the RT pool will
shrink by RT
τ
. Over time the RT pool will drain much faster
than the RF pool when p > 0.5. Indeed, the RF pool may
actually grow in this case.
Again, we omit the details of the formal argument due to
space restrictions. However, informally, this process incen-
tivizes certifiers to make more certifications on propositions
that they believe are false, since the potential rewards are
greater. At equilibrium, roughly equal amounts of true and
false propositions should carry certifications, meaning that
the lazy strategy will not be profitable. Note that certifiers are
never incentivized to certify a true proposition as false
in an attempt to acquire the RF reward, as in that case the
certifier will disagree with voters and be penalized.
VI. EXTENSION TO UNKNOWN PROPOSITIONS AND DATA
AVAILABILITY
This section presents an extension to simultaneously handle
two issues that would arise from a practical implementation
of ASTRAEA.
1) A proposition p may not have a clear answer between
true and false, e.g. if the proposition is “Is com-
plexity class P equal to NP?” [27] Since voters are
assigned a proposition randomly, they may be assigned
a proposition for which they cannot vote towards the
truth value, since the truth for some is unknown.
2) As storage directly on the blockchain is relatively ex-
pensive [28], an implementation of ASTRAEA would
most likely use an off-chain storage solution for propo-
sitions, allowing them to be uniquely identified by an
immutable public hash [29]. As such, the problem of
data availability [30] presents itself: what if the submitter
does not propagate her proposition sufficiently for the
majority of the network to see it, or a malicious actor
submits a proposition but intentionally does not share
the data corresponding to the hash? Voters would again
be unable to vote towards the truth, in this case because
the question is unavailable to them.
In both cases, the assumption in Section II-C that each
proposition has a truth value is violated. ASTRAEA can be
extended by adding a third option for voters, this of unknown.
If the voting outcome is unknown (Ø) due to a majority of
voters voting unknown, voters are neither rewarded nor pun-
ished, as in Section IV-D2. Certifiers may not take a position
of unknown, they should simply abstain from participating
in such cases. The reward structure for the game outcomes
remains the same as described in Section IV, and the analysis
of desiderata follows in a straightforward manner from that in
Section V. This extension protects players from penalization
when submitters provide unclear propositions or withhold data.
VII. APPLICATIONS
Practical applications of a decentralized, permissionless, and
trustless oracle are numerous. This section gives an overview
of candidate use cases for ASTRAEA.
Machine Learning and Data Annotation: Modern data
science techniques require a tremendous amount of annotated
data [31] to train predictive models, with applications ranging
from self-driving cars, to targeted marketing or medical di-
agnoses. Centralized crowd-sourcing platforms [32, 33] offer
a means for individuals to perform human intelligence tasks
and receive a payment. However, there have been reports of
these platforms not compensating workers properly [34] and
due to the lack of incentives to label data correctly, low-
quality labeling is prevalent in the industry. This requires
customers to pay for redundant work, since there is no easy
means of actually determining which labels are incorrect. A
decentralized oracle that incentivizes workers to vote honestly
can be used for data annotation, potentially reducing cost and
improving quality over existing solutions.
Data Availability: Decentralized applications that make use of
off-chain resources [10] suffer from the data availability prob-
lem [30], in which off-chain data may only exist transiently, or
may never have existed at all (e.g. in the case of a malicious
actor). ASTRAEA, with the extension of Section VI, can be
used as a data availability oracle for all such applications.
Adjudication Mechanisms: Negotiations between parties that
require an adjudication mechanism can instead use a decen-
tralized oracle such as ASTRAEA. In this case, the oracle will
essentially serve as a public jury. Decentralized applications
that deal with real-world resources, such as legal agreements,
transfers of assets, etc. can make use of this system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work introduces a decentralized, trustless, and permis-
sionless blockchain oracle system, ASTRAEA. Submitters enter
propositions into the system, while voters and certifiers play
a game to determine the truth value of each proposition. We
analyze the game-theoretical incentive structure to show that
a desirable Nash equilibrium exists whereby under a set of
simple assumptions all rational players behave honestly.
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